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Preface
This new research project at IIASA is concerned with modeling technological and organi-
sational change; the broader economic developments that are associated with technological
change, both as cause and effect; the processes by which economic agents – first of all,
business firms – acquire and develop the capabilities to generate, imitate and adopt techno-
logical and organisational innovations; and the aggregate dynamics – at the levels of single
industries and whole economies – engendered by the interactions among agents which are
heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and expectations. The central
purpose is to develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. However, the basic
philosophy is that such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when attention is
paid to the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to address: therefore,
a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the ‘stylized facts’ concerning
corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the ‘demography’
of firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade.
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made
on various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary
differential and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of
efforts have taken advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have
employed more traditional mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit
for modeling technological and economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a
decade ago.
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understand-
ing. There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is
known about the similarities and differencers of technical advance in different fields and
industries and there is some understanding of the key variables that lie behind those differ-
ences. A number of studies have provided rich information about how industry structure
co-evolves with technology. In addition to empirical work at the technology or sector level,
the last decade has also seen a great deal of empirical research on productivity growth
and measured technical advance at the level of whole economies. A considerable body
of empirical research now exists on the facts that seem associated with different rates of
productivity growth across the range of nations, with the dynamics of convergence and
divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income in different countries, with the
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded.
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that successful theory and useful
modeling techniques ought to address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical
work described above often has been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts
that needed to be explained. The list of these ‘facts’ is indeed very long, ranging from the
microeconomic evidence concerning for example dynamic increasing returns in learning
activities or the persistence of particular sets of problem-solving routines within business
firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and size-distributions – approximately
log-normal; all the way to the evidence regarding the time-series properties of major
economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical work and the
empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project is
that the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques
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can be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who
understand the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists
and their work.
In particular, the project is meant to pursue an ‘evolutionary’ interpretation of tech-
nological and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents
and organisations learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of ‘natural se-
lection’ by which interactive environments – often markets – winnow out a population
whose members have different attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective
emergence of statistical patterns, regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate
outcomes of the two former processes.
Together with a group of researchers located permanently at IIASA, the project co-
ordinates multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world,
organises workshops and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working
on evolutionary modeling, computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems.
The research will focus upon the following three major areas:
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 2. Technological and Indus-
trial Dynamics 3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics
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Summary
Consider two populations of agents who learn to play a game through repetition. In ficti-
tious play, each agent chooses a best reply to the frequency distribution of actions taken
by the other side. A natural variant of this model is to assume that agents are heteroge-
neous in their information and their behavioral response rules. Assume that each agent
knows only a randomly drawn sample of past actions. Given their information, agents
sometimes choose best replies, and sometimes they imitate behavior in their own popula-
tion. In contrast to the stochastic best reply dynamics studied by Fudenberg and Kreps
(1993), Kaniovski and Young (1995), and Bena¨ım and Hirsch (1994), such process can
cycle in a 2× 2 game even when the probability of imitators is arbitrarily small. We show
how to characterize its asymptotic behavior through an extension of Bendixson’s theory
for excluding cycles combined with standard techniques from stochastic approximation.
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